<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Philosophy of Mind: Descartes</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/</link>
	<description>Thoughts on artificial intelligence, cognitive science, academia, and life in general.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2012 22:07:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: David Williams</title>
		<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/comment-page-1/#comment-28260</link>
		<dc:creator>David Williams</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Feb 2010 15:50:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/#comment-28260</guid>
		<description>RE the article: http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

&quot;Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators, in turn, may also be simulated beings.&quot;

Doesn&#039;t this infinite regress apply to any and all notions of simulation, therefore negating their validity?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RE the article: <a href="http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html</a></p>
<p>&#8220;Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators, in turn, may also be simulated beings.&#8221;</p>
<p>Doesn&#8217;t this infinite regress apply to any and all notions of simulation, therefore negating their validity?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Andreas</title>
		<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/comment-page-1/#comment-7484</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2007 11:21:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/#comment-7484</guid>
		<description>Yes, it is possible that consciousness depends on low-level-physics and that this makes it impossible to simulate consciousness on any system that is not implemented in exactly the same physical way. I don&#039;t think we have much of an idea how likely this is.

In any case, you won&#039;t be able to prove that you are not living in a simulation -- maybe simulations &lt;em&gt;can&lt;/em&gt; give rise to consciousness and the simulators interfere with the simulation as soon as you stumble upon the proof that everything consciousness depends on are the underlying patterns.

I will follow up with a few blog entries on consciousness and qualia soon.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, it is possible that consciousness depends on low-level-physics and that this makes it impossible to simulate consciousness on any system that is not implemented in exactly the same physical way. I don&#8217;t think we have much of an idea how likely this is.</p>
<p>In any case, you won&#8217;t be able to prove that you are not living in a simulation &#8212; maybe simulations <em>can</em> give rise to consciousness and the simulators interfere with the simulation as soon as you stumble upon the proof that everything consciousness depends on are the underlying patterns.</p>
<p>I will follow up with a few blog entries on consciousness and qualia soon.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: David</title>
		<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/comment-page-1/#comment-7287</link>
		<dc:creator>David</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 May 2007 16:23:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/#comment-7287</guid>
		<description>&quot;no real disproof of the simulation argument&quot;
What if it&#039;s not possible to simulate consciousness in a virtual environment? I could imagine, that there are several possibilities which would lead to this conclusion.

I think that the probability of this should be approximated by 50% without further knowledge...
And I may be pessimistic, but I even don&#039;t think that you will be able to proof that I have the sensasion of &quot;consciousness&quot; - because it&#039;s (probably...) not possible, and thus (by far) not computable.

Maybe, it just depends on how you define consciousness, and that may be the problem! (ála &quot;Ein System kann nicht zum Beweis seiner eigenen Widerspruchsfreiheit verwendet werden.&quot;)

How do you think about this?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;no real disproof of the simulation argument&#8221;<br />
What if it&#8217;s not possible to simulate consciousness in a virtual environment? I could imagine, that there are several possibilities which would lead to this conclusion.</p>
<p>I think that the probability of this should be approximated by 50% without further knowledge&#8230;<br />
And I may be pessimistic, but I even don&#8217;t think that you will be able to proof that I have the sensasion of &#8220;consciousness&#8221; &#8211; because it&#8217;s (probably&#8230;) not possible, and thus (by far) not computable.</p>
<p>Maybe, it just depends on how you define consciousness, and that may be the problem! (ála &#8220;Ein System kann nicht zum Beweis seiner eigenen Widerspruchsfreiheit verwendet werden.&#8221;)</p>
<p>How do you think about this?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Andreas</title>
		<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/comment-page-1/#comment-4345</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 21:58:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/#comment-4345</guid>
		<description>That&#039;s the actual essay. A serious, impressive-sounding one would have been both boring and inappropriate -- I&#039;m curious whether the tutors are of the same opinion. Probably not.

The flaw with your argument is exactly the one you point out at the end of your comment: If we really were deceived about our corporeal existence, &lt;em&gt;everything&lt;/em&gt; would exist in the substance of our mind -- including the seemingly physical environment and every interaction between the mind and the environment. Causing yourself pain by thinking too hard wouldn&#039;t be different from causing yourself pain by hitting your head against the wall.

There is no real disproof of the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;simulation argument&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s the actual essay. A serious, impressive-sounding one would have been both boring and inappropriate &#8212; I&#8217;m curious whether the tutors are of the same opinion. Probably not.</p>
<p>The flaw with your argument is exactly the one you point out at the end of your comment: If we really were deceived about our corporeal existence, <em>everything</em> would exist in the substance of our mind &#8212; including the seemingly physical environment and every interaction between the mind and the environment. Causing yourself pain by thinking too hard wouldn&#8217;t be different from causing yourself pain by hitting your head against the wall.</p>
<p>There is no real disproof of the <a href="http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html" rel="nofollow">simulation argument</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Thorben</title>
		<link>http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/comment-page-1/#comment-4314</link>
		<dc:creator>Thorben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 15:31:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/descartes/#comment-4314</guid>
		<description>Nice work. (Was this your actual essay?)

Do not take the following entirely serious, I made this up in 5 minutes, so this thought experiment is not likely to withstand serious philosophical debates ;-)

I consider my mind as a thing only I have access to. What I think and imagine takes place in my mind, and even if I am deceived over the rest of my perception, I consider my thoughts as being real and physically taking place *somewhere* (hopefully as a couple of billion neurons at war with each other, rather than some electric charges on some &quot;dirty&quot; silicone). Anyone trying to deceive me, would have to do so via well defined interfaces. (Retinal nerves, spinal cord and whatnot.)

When we agree on this, we can also agree, that any headache I might have, obtained just by excessive thinking of course, is *real*, takes place in the physical world.

So, to find out, whether I am more or less the physical person I perceive myself to be, I would generate a headache by excessive thinking, while lying comfortably in my bed for example. When I finally got a decent throbbing in the head, I would suddenly jump up quickly.... aaaah, physical pain... so sweet.

Finally I know I am real, because I hacked myself a sixth sense: Just through the power of my thoughts, my brain became an &quot;accelerometer&quot;.

Ok right, I see the weaknesses in this thought experiment, too. If I was the deceiver, and your mind was in this vat in front of me, I would dynamically adjust the blood pressures and stuff to match the physical activities you think you are doing. You really had a headache and commanded your simulated body to do a jump, a brief (negative) peak in blood pressure, which normally would have gone by unnoticed would then result in the increased pain, accepted by you as evidence for the physical existence of your perceived body. D&#039;oh</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nice work. (Was this your actual essay?)</p>
<p>Do not take the following entirely serious, I made this up in 5 minutes, so this thought experiment is not likely to withstand serious philosophical debates ;-)</p>
<p>I consider my mind as a thing only I have access to. What I think and imagine takes place in my mind, and even if I am deceived over the rest of my perception, I consider my thoughts as being real and physically taking place *somewhere* (hopefully as a couple of billion neurons at war with each other, rather than some electric charges on some &#8220;dirty&#8221; silicone). Anyone trying to deceive me, would have to do so via well defined interfaces. (Retinal nerves, spinal cord and whatnot.)</p>
<p>When we agree on this, we can also agree, that any headache I might have, obtained just by excessive thinking of course, is *real*, takes place in the physical world.</p>
<p>So, to find out, whether I am more or less the physical person I perceive myself to be, I would generate a headache by excessive thinking, while lying comfortably in my bed for example. When I finally got a decent throbbing in the head, I would suddenly jump up quickly&#8230;. aaaah, physical pain&#8230; so sweet.</p>
<p>Finally I know I am real, because I hacked myself a sixth sense: Just through the power of my thoughts, my brain became an &#8220;accelerometer&#8221;.</p>
<p>Ok right, I see the weaknesses in this thought experiment, too. If I was the deceiver, and your mind was in this vat in front of me, I would dynamically adjust the blood pressures and stuff to match the physical activities you think you are doing. You really had a headache and commanded your simulated body to do a jump, a brief (negative) peak in blood pressure, which normally would have gone by unnoticed would then result in the increased pain, accepted by you as evidence for the physical existence of your perceived body. D&#8217;oh</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

