Comments on: You are your brain — but in what way? http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/smart/ Thoughts on artificial intelligence, cognitive science, academia, and life in general. Thu, 19 Aug 2010 14:51:14 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0 By: Andreas http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/smart/comment-page-1/#comment-6388 Andreas Thu, 03 May 2007 09:26:21 +0000 http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/smart/#comment-6388 Thanks for your feedback. You are right, one must not forget that there are alternative theories of mind besides type physicalism. Especially functionalism and nonreductive physicalism may bring less serious problems with them than Smart's theory does. (I am just starting to learn about the different theories regarding mind, consciousness and body.) A paper on Hilary Putnam's position will be up within a few days. Thanks for your feedback. You are right, one must not forget that there are alternative theories of mind besides type physicalism. Especially functionalism and nonreductive physicalism may bring less serious problems with them than Smart’s theory does. (I am just starting to learn about the different theories regarding mind, consciousness and body.)

A paper on Hilary Putnam’s position will be up within a few days.

]]> By: Matthias Kiesselbach http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/smart/comment-page-1/#comment-6384 Matthias Kiesselbach Thu, 03 May 2007 08:42:15 +0000 http://www.aiplayground.org/artikel/smart/#comment-6384 Maybe you should, towards the end of your paper, at least hint at the alternative approach constituted by functionalism. Various people (including one of history's many Putnams) now see mental states as functionally defined. They think that a mental state occupies a functional position in a whole, indeed holistic, network of such states. The world of neurology, behaviour, chemistry and what have you, only enters the picture after that. "Pain", for example, is "the brain-state (or fiber-stimulation or...) that realises the pain-role given by the whole network of functionally defined roles". This, of course, is a view flowing from the idea of multiple realisation. (A later Putnam has, as far as I know, begun to criticise this view, however.) Anyway, very interesting blog. (I stumbled across it on one of these blog catalogues on my search for other philosophy blogs.) Keep it up. Maybe you should, towards the end of your paper, at least hint at the alternative approach constituted by functionalism. Various people (including one of history’s many Putnams) now see mental states as functionally defined. They think that a mental state occupies a functional position in a whole, indeed holistic, network of such states. The world of neurology, behaviour, chemistry and what have you, only enters the picture after that. “Pain”, for example, is “the brain-state (or fiber-stimulation or…) that realises the pain-role given by the whole network of functionally defined roles”. This, of course, is a view flowing from the idea of multiple realisation. (A later Putnam has, as far as I know, begun to criticise this view, however.)

Anyway, very interesting blog. (I stumbled across it on one of these blog catalogues on my search for other philosophy blogs.) Keep it up.

]]>